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Directly Constraining Marginal Prices
Kyri Baker, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The marginal price of electricity traditionally de-
pends on the dual variables associated with relevant optimization
goals. Particularly, in the optimal power flow realm, prices
represent the cost of supplying an additional unit of power at each
bus; for the economic dispatch case, dual variables represent the
cost of supplying an additional unit of power to the whole system.
Dual variables are useful for many additional tasks, including the
analysis of system congestion and the determination of the cost
of load adjustments. In this letter, departing from conventional
optimal power flow analysis, it is shown how constraints on
relevant dual variables affect the prices of electricity, allowing
for market settings and demand response programs that accept
bids and caps on individual prices.
Index Terms—Power systems optimization, demand side bid-
ding, marginal pricing, duality theory
I. INTRODUCTION
As we move towards a smarter and more flexible power grid,
an increased number of entities may be willing to participate
in demand response (DR), from industrial customers to indi-
vidual households. This heightened participation could have
the potential to drastically reduce or increase the load, and
perhaps even cause instability and oscillations in the system as
multiple entities simultaneously respond to DR signals. This
phenomenon has already been observed to some degree in
current demand response programs and is dubbed the “rebound
effect” [1].
In addition, many limitations exist in current DR programs
[2]. Many of the DR techniques involve one-way commu-
nication of a pricing signal that the customer can decide to
respond to, or offer a flat rate for reducing demand during peak
hours. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric’s Demand Bidding
Program gives a $0.50/kWh for providing load reduction ser-
vice during specific times. In PJM Interconnection’s demand
bidding program, consumers make bids for a portion of their
load that they are willing to reduce. The bid is accepted when
the market clears if it is less than the market price.
Current approaches may neglect to account for the fact that
as an increased number of entities are participating in DR
programs, the benefit from DR may decrease, the amount
of volatility in the system may increase, and the “rebound
effect” may occur. For example, if a utility sends out a
signal advertising a $0.50/kWh payment for consumers to
reduce their demand in the next hour and more loads than
necessary decide to participate, the utility’s gain from this
decreases. Conversely, demand side bidding (DSB) requires
each participating entity to specify a price and kWh bid, which
may not be straightforward to determine, and is not always
included directly into the optimization problem. For example, a
homeowner may wish to spend no more than $100 a month on
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electricity, but is unable to determine the corresponding level
of energy to and therefore is unable to submit an informed bid
in this market structure.
In this letter we propose an alternate approach to DSB
that includes bids directly in the optimization problem. Issues
such as price volatility and market power can be mitigated by
DSB [3], and we propose to implement this DR structure by
not only accepting (price, kWh) bids, but by accepting bids
based solely on price. Mathematically, a method to include
explicit constraints on electricity price has currently not been
formulated due to the fact that price is usually an output of the
optimization and not known a priori. However, in this letter, it
can be shown that by using optimization duality theory, these
prices can be directly constrained, and this new constraint
translates to a new variable in terms of power consumption
in the original optimization problem. When these variables
can be constrained directly, demand side bidding, individual
consumer budgeting, and prevention of price fluctuations can
be explicitly considered in the optimization problem.
II. DERIVATION OF THE PRICE-CONSTRAINED
OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In order to demonstrate how constraining the Lagrange
multipliers affects the primal problem, first define a general
quadratic programming problem (a general optimal power
flow problem with linearized AC power flow equations or no
network consideration):
minimize
x
1
2
x
T
Qx+ cTx
subject to Ax ≤ b
(1)
where x is a n-dimensional vector of primal problem vari-
ables such as generator values, voltage angle, and flexible
load values. Matrix Q is an n × n real, positive definite
symmetric matrix, A is an m× n real matrix, and b is an m-
dimensional real vector. The linearized power flow equations
can be captured in the constraints. We form the Lagrangian
dual function:
g(λ) = inf
x
1
2
x
T
Qx+ cTx+ λT (Ax− b) (2)
Where λ is a m-dimensional vector of dual variables. We
observe that the infimum is obtained for x = −Q−1(c+ATλ).
Substituting this into (2), we obtain the dual function in terms
of only the dual variables:
g(λ) = −
1
2
λ
T
AQ
−1
A
T
λ− λ
T (b+ AQ−1c)−
1
2
c
T
Q
−1
c (3)
Defining P = AQ−1AT and t = b + AQ−1c, we can write
the dual problem as the following:
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minimize
λ
1
2
λ
T
Pλ+ tTλ
subject to λ ≥ 0
(4)
Assuming Slater’s condition holds, and because the primal
problem is convex, strong duality will hold between the primal
and dual problems [4], and the cost function value of the dual
problem is the same as that of the primal problem. The λ’s
that correspond to the power balance equations at every bus are
commonly referred to as the locational marginal price (LMP)
value at that bus. These represent the price that an entity at
that node would have to pay in order to consume an additional
unit of power. For example, assume we will constrain the price
at bus k by adding the constraint λk ≤ m to the optimization
problem. Adding a constraint into the dual problem adds an
additional variable α into the primal problem. Assuming the
power balance constraint for bus k is constraint i, the new
primal problem is thus
minimize
x
1
2
x
T
Qx+cTx+mα
subject to (Ax)j ≤ bj , j 6= i
(Ax)i − α ≤ bi
α ≥ 0
(5)
where (Ax)j denotes row j of matrix A multiplied by the jth
variable in vector x and bj denotes the jth entry in vector b.
Of course, the inclusion of this additional constraint introduces
the possibility of making the problem infeasible. Future work
into market structures and bid clearing mechanisms under this
framework will be performed to ensure feasibility.
III. LINEAR EXAMPLE
A. Optimization Formulation
For simplicity and clarity, first we formulate an economic
dispatch problem where the network constraints are not con-
sidered and the cost function is linear. Assume an industrial
customer wants to determine how many widgets to produce
in a given day. The cost to run their gas generator PG to
produce these widgets is $a/kW. The benefit they gain from
producing widgets can be defined as $b/kW. The minimum
and maximum amount of power they can consume is PL and
PL, respectively. Thus, the overall optimization problem is:
maximize
PG,PL
− aPG+bPL
subject to PL ≤ PL ≤ PL
PG − PL = 0
PG, PL ≥ 0
(6)
The dual of (6) is then written as:
minimize
λ
− PLλ1 + PLλ2
subject to µ ≥ −a
−λ1 + λ2 − µ ≥ b
λ1, λ2, µ ≥ 0
(7)
Where µ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the power
balance constraint PG − PL = 0. Assume that the maximum
amount the customer wants to pay to produce widgets for that
hour is m; i.e., µ ≤ m. Reformulating the new primal problem,
a variable Pm corresponding to the new constraint is added,
and the final new primal is as follows:
maximize
PG,PL,Pm
− aPG + bPL−mPm
subject to PL ≤ PL ≤ PL
PG − PL − Pm = 0
PG, PL, Pm ≥ 0
(8)
B. Karush-Kuhn-Tuker (KKT) Conditions
By comparing the KKT conditions for (6) and (8), we
can observe how the optimal solution of the original primal
problem is changed by the inclusion of this additional dual
variable constraint, and interpret the new variable, Pm. Define
the Lagrangian functions for the original primal and new
primal problem, respectively, as follows:
L1(PG, PL, λ, µ) = −aPG + bPL + λ1(−PL + PL)
+ λ2(PL − PL) + µ(PG − PL)− λ3(PG)
L2(PG, PL, Pm, λ, µ) = −aPG + bPL −mPm + λ1(−PL + PL)
+λ2(PL − PL) + µ(PG − PL − Pm)− λ3(PG)− λ4(Pm)
Most of the KKT conditions of both problems are identical;
however, the following relevant conditions differ:
Original Primal µ(PG − PL) = 0
New Primal µ(PG − PL − Pm) = 0
−m− µ− λ4 = 0
The new variable Pm, which must be nonnegative, can be
interpreted as the amount of load reduction required to reach
the specified price, m, if the original optimal solution of the
primal problem previously resulted in an optimal price that
was greater than m.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Constraining the Lagrange multipliers in the optimal power
flow problem allows for consideration of problem formulations
that could not be considered previously. With this framework,
advanced demand side bidding techniques could be explicitly
included in the optimization problem, as well as the hedging
against price fluctuations that could occur due to intermittent
energy sources or the rebound effect from dynamic pricing.
Future work will develop more detailed market structures by
utilizing this mathematical framework, including methodolo-
gies for the acceptance/rejection of bids, and provide analyses
on what opportunities this framework could open for demand
response programs.
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